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Introduction.  The assignment described in this paper is associated with the July 6, 2013, 
Asiana Flight 214 Accident and NTSB Safety Recommendation A-14-43. The underlying question 
in this assignment is whether flightcrews have enough time to respond12to a low 
airspeed/energy alert leading to a successful airplane recovery.  In general, “time is a widely 
accepted means for evaluation of procedures used in the management and control of complex, 
dynamic systems, such as airliners. Time is also correlated with errors, operational efficiency, 
and task loading.”3  
The NTSB had concluded that in the case of the Asiana Flight 214 accident that the low-
airspeed/energy alert was presented too late to be effective.  The following is a quote from the 
NTSB report on the Asiana Flight 214 Accident: “The warning still would have occurred about 11 
seconds before impact, and additional time would have been required for the flight crew to 
take corrective action.”  
 
Assignment History.  The initial assignment was made by Clark Badie, ASHWG Chairman during 
the first ASHWG face to face meeting (14 November 2018) in Phoenix.  Loran Haworth 
(ASHWG/NASA) was asked by the ASHWG chair to prepare and draft responses to the assigned 
questions for review by the ASHWG, FAA and in particular the flight test harmonization working 
group.  The initial assignment was then delivered to the ASHWG before the second ASHWG 
meeting in Phoenix on May 1-2, 2019.   
During the second ASHWG meeting, Haworth was asked to update the initial assignment, which 
is presented in this paper. Recommendations and rationale for both assignments were 
prepared, reviewed and coordinated among the following individuals at NASA Ames: Loran 
Haworth, (ASHWG/SJSUF/ARC), Dr. Michael Feary (ARC-TH) NASA Lead and Dr. Randall Mumaw 
(SJSUF/ARC).  These authors wish to acknowledge at the beginning of this paper that there are 
many elements associated with an effective flightcrew alert but, also want to emphasize the 
criticality of alerts presented early enough to enable the flightcrew to respond and successfully 
recover the airplane.   
The information presented in this assignment refers to current applicable regulatory 
airworthiness information.   Also covered are principles/points of agreement, methods/means 
4of compliance (MOC), and an introduction to a new recommended MOC which is based on the 
time the low airspeed/energy recovery procedure must be completed compared  to the actual 
time on procedure making this MOC  consistent with the requirement in §25.101 (h)(3) 5 . 
                                                          
1 A successful response mentioned above is defined as one that would enable the flightcrew and airplane to 
continue safe flight following the alert. 
2 FR Doc. 2018-00821 Filed 1-17-18; 8:45 am 
3 “Available Operational Time Window: A Method for Evaluating and Monitoring Airline Procedures,”  H K Kourdali  
& Lance Sherry George Mason University ,Journal of Cognitive Engineering and Decision Making · August 2017 
4 The words “methods” and “means” in terms of FAA compliance have the same meaning.   
5 Our current interpretation of this rule includes the procedures associated with recovery from  low 
airspeed/energy conditions.  If there are other interpretations, the principle associated with including any time 
delays seems fundamental.  
 The assignment: "Response times - what to follow, and why?   How does that have an 
impact on design and evaluation?" 
Impact on design.  The ASHWG Chairman’s question about the “impact to design” regarding 
“response times” should be answered first because it asks why identifying response time 
allowances are important in airplane design?  The answer is straightforward since determining 
the Time on Procedure(s) (ToP) allowances6 (time delays) for the flightcrew, the equipment, 
and the airplane allows airplane designers to determine when (how early) the low airspeed 
(energy) flightcrew alert needs to be presented to the flightcrew to be effective7.   
Comparing the ToP to the Allowable Operational Time Windows (AOTW)8 also allows the 
designer to define the limitations of the alert as to when the alert cannot be timely9 or useful10.  
Knowledge of the limitations of the alert should become part of the risk assessment11 
(identified failure conditions12) and also distinguishes those areas to the designer and 
certification team as to when mitigation or improved design is warranted if the alert cannot 
also be successful (timely) for all operational conditions.   
Regulatory concerns.  A flightcrew alert presented too late is ineffective, will lead to unintended 
consequences (e.g., Inability of the flightcrew to control the airplane in time to avoid the low 
airspeed (energy) state and will potentially lead to subsequent airplane accidents.  Therefore 
the low airspeed (energy) flightcrew alert presented too late would not: 
1. meet its proposed intended function13 as required by §25.1301(a)(1) and  §25.1309(a) 
                                                          
6  The Time on Procedure (ToP) for this paper considers all the response time allowances/delays from all sources 
and are similar in definition to time delays found in the §25.101(h)(3) rule that states the following:  “Include 
allowance for any time delays, in the execution of the procedures, that may reasonably be expected in service. “ 
7 In this sentence an effective alert is one that is presented early enough to the flightcrew for the flightcrew to 
continue flying the airplane safely.   
8 “Available Operational Time Window: A Method for Evaluating and Monitoring Airline Procedures,”  H K Kourdali  
& Lance Sherry George Mason University ,Journal of Cognitive Engineering and Decision Making · August 2017 
 
9 The word timely in this sentence is an alert presented early enough to the flightcrew that will enable the 
flightcrew to properly respond and continue flying the airplane safely. 
10 Example of limitation based on timely. AC 25.1329-1C para 57 a.2. “Standard stall warning and high-speed alerts 
are not always timely enough for the flightcrew to intervene to prevent unacceptable speed excursions during FGS 
operation”. 
11 One of the initial steps in establishing compliance with § 25.1309 for a system is to identify the failure conditions 
that are associated with that system (AC 25.1329-1C para 100 a.(1).) 
12 This depends somewhat on the stated intended function of the alert. 
13 The currently proposed intended function of this alert is to attract the flight crew’s attention to an impending 
low energy condition early enough during approach and landing that the flightcrew can avoid or recover from the 
low energy condition and continue safe flight.  
 2. be considered a timely attention-getting cue required by §25.1322(c)(2) when an 
appropriate and timely reponse (AC 25.1322-1 Paragraph 4.a.)14 is expected. 
3. meet the requirement §25.1309 (c) Warning information must be provided to alert the 
crew to unsafe system operating conditions, and to enable them to take appropriate 
corrective action. 
4. be accessible and usable by the flightcrew in a manner consistent with the urgency, 
frequency, and duration of their tasks (§25.1302(b)(2));  
5. be designed to enable the flightcrew to intervene in a manner appropriate to the task 
(§25.1302(c)(2))  
6. enable flightcrew awareness, if awareness is required for safe operation, of the effects 
on the airplane or systems resulting from flightcrew actions (§25.1302(b)(3)). 
7.  include allowance for any time delays, in the execution of the procedures, that may 
reasonably be expected in service (§25.101 (h)(3))15.  Note the wording “any time 
delays.” 
8. meet the safe operation and flightcrew workload requirements in §25.1523 as 
determined in appendix D of Part 25.  Areas of consideration include accessibility, 
directing proper corrective action, urgency, and complexity of operating procedures, 
degree of duration of conentrated mental effort and diagnosing, and coping with 
malfunctions and emergencies. 
 
 
Principles/points of agreement and discussion.  Recommend ASHWG agreement and or 
discussion on the points listed below. Some of the following language may be considered 
redundant, but each captures one specific point or principle.  
 
1.  that a low airspeed (energy) flightcrew alert presented too late will not meet the 
proposed intended function for the low airspeed (energy) alert or the other requirements 
as discussed and listed in the paragraph above (Impact on designing).   The effect of a 
flightcrew alert presented too late to the flightcrew is similar to no alert.1617  That is the 
alert cannot be successful as a low airspeed/energy flightcrew alert. 
                                                          
14 “the provision of an alerting system that aids the flightcrew in identifying non-normal operational or airplane 
system conditions and in responding in an appropriate and timely manner is an essential feature of every flight 
deck design” 
15 Our current interpretation of this rule includes the procedures associated with low airspeed/energy conditions.  
If there are other interpretations, the principle associated with including any time delays seems fundamental. 
16 Descent Below Visual Glidepath and Impact With Seawall Asiana Airlines Flight 214 Boeing 777-200ER, HL7742 
San Francisco, California July 6, 2013 NTSB/AAR-14/01 PB2014-105984 Notation 8518 Adopted June 24, 2014 
(page 105). 
17 The Role of Alerting System Failures in Loss of Control Accidents CAST SE-210 Output 2Report 3 of 6, NASA/TM—
2019–220176.  The material in this report was also presented to the ASHWG via WebEx on 2 May 2019 by Randy 
Mumaw at NASA-Ames 
 2.  that the time delay allowance requirement found in § 25.101 (h) is the applicable 
regulation regarding pilot, equipment and airplane time delay allowances.  § 25.101 (h)(3) 
says the following “Include allowance for any time delays, in the execution of the 
procedures, that may reasonably be expected in service.”  AC 25-7D only partly supports 
that requirement by stating the following in para 4.3.2, which lists §25.101(h) as the 
applicable regulation “regarding pilot18 action time delay allowances.” The actual rule 
language, however, takes account of all time delays (not just pilot delay allowance), which 
would include equipment and airplane response delays.  Since §25.101 is not accompanied 
by its own AC, modification of the AC 25-7 to correct and expand on the actual rule 
language delays is highly recommended. 
3.   all sources of delay (e.g., flightcrew, equipment, and airplane) must be considered 
(§25.101(h)(3)) in determining how far in advance the low and slow airspeed (energy) alert 
should be presented to be timely as stated above.  It is also critical that allowances for the 
flightcrew, equipment, and airplane be based on qualified flightcrews and the 
representative equipment and airplane undergoing certification.  These delays are directly 
dependent on the equipment installed (information displays, access to lookup tables, access 
to display menus, controls, systems, and airplane) and should not be generalized.  The ToP 
should be compared to the AOTW to determine the limitations of the alert. 
4.  that while predetermined in-service delay times associated with pilot actions such as 
those found in AC 25-7D provide a standardized methodology during flight test, the use of 
any predetermined delay time values to represent delays should be questioned.  The source 
and rationale behind the predetermined times should be provided and justified by the FAA 
and industry.  For example, some predetermined times maybe based on outdated civil air 
regulations and some test techniques are likely maintained because they worked in the past 
but are perhaps founded on earlier airplane designs that were mostly manually flown.  Also 
predetermined in service delay times may not consider multiple pilots (flightcrews), 
airplane design variations, limitations of the alert, and continued safe flight following the 
alert.  
5.  that the flightcrew response time allowances be determined from measured flightcrew 
reaction times (human capability) using empirical methods of establishing minimum 
response times associated with the low airspeed (energy) flightcrew alert.   It is 
recommended that the flightcrew reaction time allowance be structured on the 95th 
percentile statistical distribution tail (slower cases) rather than an average time allowance 
value.  Using the average or mean would imply that roughly half of the population 
distribution (many flightcrews) could not achieve the average reaction time. Also, flightcrew 
time allowances should be adequate for the flightcrew to not only respond to the alert but 
                                                          
18 Note the reference to “pilot” rather than “flightcrew”.  Time delays/response time should be associated with 
flightcrew actions when applicable.  The time delay associated with a flightcrew are probably different than the 
response time of one pilot.  
 also minimize flight crew error, per § 25.1302 (e.g., follow specified procedure in their 
response) and then continue to safely fly the airplane.  As mentioned earlier, time is 
correlated with errors, operational efficiency, and task loading.  It is important that time 
measures be based on flightcrew (2 or more crewmembers) response times rather than one 
pilot except in the case of the incapacitated flightcrew situation (AC 25.1523-1). 
6.  that a complete response to a hazard (e.g., low airspeed/energy condition) may involve a 
series of responses (actions taken) by the flightcrew leading to avoidance of the low and 
slow airspeed (energy) state. Some actions will be discrete (moving a switch) while others 
may involve continued adjustments to flight controls over time.  While the initial response 
to an alert is critical, so are the follow on flightcrew responses and actions leading to 
successful avoidance of the low airspeed (energy) condition19.  Some flightcrew actions 
affecting airplane equipment will generate equipment response delays  (e.g., the time to 
spool up engines using thrust levers, changing flap settings, raising landing gear, etc.) some 
of which are lengthy (According to one propulsion expert, the delay for large engines on 
transport airplanes to spool up could be substantial (e.g., more than 30 seconds).  The 
emphasis here considers the delay allowances associated with equipment activation and 
response. 
7.  that following flightcrew control inputs to increase airspeed, decrease drag and climb the 
airplane, additional time delays associated with altering the total energy vector of the 
airplane to avoid the low and slow airspeed (energy) condition are expected.  The emphasis 
here is the delay associated with the complete airplane response itself (e.g., from a low, 
slow descent to a climb at a faster airspeed). 
8.  that the forcing function behind the flightcrew response allowance be established on 
measured flightcrew reaction times (human capability) for the low and slow airspeed 
(energy) flightcrew alert rather than other methods such as airspeed margins that do not 
directly consider time as required by §25.101(h)(3).  However, airspeed margins could be 
used to trigger a low airspeed/energy alert as long as it can be fully demonstrated that the 
margin will reliably and accurately provide sufficient time for the flightcrew, equipment, 
and airplane to respond within the AOTW and continue safe flight.   
9.  that we should discuss mitigation as an alternative when qualified flightcrews cannot 
adequately respond in time to successfully operate the equipment and airplane to avoid the 
low airspeed (energy) state.  Examples of mitigation already exist with automated systems 
that provide early flight control responses in specific conditions.  Another type of mitigation 
                                                          
19 It is worth mentioning that operational data shows that autopilots are used more than 90% of 
the time.  Any mode confusion as to autopilot control of the airplane could significantly impact 
the flightcrew’s reaction time and responses.  Reference: Addressing Mode Confusion Using an 
Interpreter Display, Randall J. Mumaw, San José State University Research Foundation, April 
2018. DOI 10.13140/RG.2.2.27980.92801  
 for the low airspeed/energy case recommended for investigation is that of establishing an 
earlier alert such as an alert for an unstable approach that can be a precursor to a low 
energy situation on approach.   
10. that the ASHWG discuss cueing on the flight deck associated with low airspeed (energy) 
situations (e.g., airspeed indications as one example).  The ASHWG should provide 
recommendations on this subject.   
11.  that the ASHWG discuss and recommend the level or category for the low 
airspeed/energy alert (Warning, Caution, Advisory).  §25.1322 does not establish the 
alerting level/category for a specific alert, but, it can be established within the rule requiring 
the alert.  Should it be considered a time critical warning as an example?   
 
What to follow, and why? 
History 
Before the ASHWG 2-3 May 2019 meeting the ASHWG recommended the following rule 
language: 
For a low airspeed (energy) alert to be effective, it must be presented early enough for 
qualified flightcrew and aircraft equipment to avoid the low energy condition/state and 
safely recover.  Time allowances should be adequate: 
 
 for the flightcrew to respond to the alert within the AOTW while, minimize flight 
crew error, per §25.1302 (e.g., access displayed information, follow specified 
procedure, etc.), 
 for the airplane equipment to respond (e.g., engine spool up time) and, 
 for the airplane to be safely recovered (e.g., manual or automatic)  
 
The first bullet, in combination with the general statement above, assumes that qualified 
flightcrews will have adequate time to correctly/adequately respond to the alert to avoid the 
low energy condition/state, including a safe recovery. Flightcrew correctly responding 
(minimizing error) means that flightcrews will follow the required procedures ideally without 
error.   
Update 
The proposed rule language from above was updated on 2 May 2019 at the ASHWG meeting in 
Phoenix.  That proposed language is shown below.   
 
“Alerting that informs the flightcrew in a timely manner in advance of a low energy 
condition during the approach phase of flight to enable the flightcrew to continue to 
Safely fly the airplane”. 
 Discussion.  
The proposed rule was trimmed to the language provided above during the ASHWG 1-2 May 
2019 meeting.  The newer wording removes the word “qualified.” as in qualified flightcrew.  
The language “qualified flightcrew” is used explicitly in the new FAA regulation §25.1302 to 
indicate the qualification of the flightcrew that airplane systems and equipment are designed to 
meet.  This recent modification (removing the word qualified) may create future conflicts and 
confusion with airworthiness rules since it opens the opportunity to satisfy the rule based on 
other means such as the ambiguous “average pilot” used in older FAA requirements.    Rule 
25.1302 uses the following specific words: “The applicant must show that these systems and 
installed equipment, individually and in combination with other such systems and equipment, 
are designed so that qualified flightcrew members trained in their use can safely perform all of 
the tasks associated with the systems' and equipment's intended functions”.  In summary, 
consistent and standardized language among regulatory requirements lowers potential 
confusion during the certification process and also legally.   
Recommendations associated with the updated rule language wording is provide below. 
 
Further recommendation and discussion based on the updated wording: 
 
1. Add the adjective “qualified” to the word flightcrew to the proposed rule language.  
If the word “qualified” is not used other more ambiguous wording could be used. 
2. Ensure that the words “timely manner” are defined in the AC 25-7D and associate 
those words with the requirements in §25.101 and requirements stated above in the 
AC and method of compliance. 
3. Discuss the use of the words “safely fly.”  For example, is there any other option 
other than performing a go-around if a low energy condition is experienced during 
the approach phase? If this is the only option discuss changing the wording “…to 
enable the flightcrew to safely perform a go-around.”  
4. The words “continue “to safely fly the airplane” contains a split infinitive.  To fly the 
airplane safely is another wording option for consideration.  
 
What to follow and Evaluation.   
 
Standard methods of compliance (Appendix A) should be followed in addition to the 
suggestions provided in Appendix B for determining the timeliness of an effective low airspeed 
(energy) flightcrew alert20.   
                                                          
20 The words in the draft list shown in appendix B can be changed or modified by the ASHWG but the following 
steps (perhaps additional ones) should be included in determining response times.   
 Additional Concerns that should be addressed 
 
AC 25-7D.  We found both technical and administrative concerns when reviewing AC 25-7D 
“Flight test Guide for Certification of Transport Category Airplanes” that maybe misleading.  The 
AC 25-7 is a very unique AC that combines many dozens of often complicated rules and policy 
material associated with flight test into one advisory document.  It is the reviewers’ opinion, 
and we believe the opinion of the FAA that AC 25-7 is administratively challenging to update 
and keep updated.  We believe this is primarily due to the many dozens of rules that AC 25-7 
encompasses and the length of time it takes to update the AC.  Even when this very unique AC 
“Flight test Guide for Certification of Transport Category Airplanes” is occasionally updated, 
often only certain areas are updated.  As an example the latest update of the AC 25-7 does not 
reference or include the latest method of compliance updates for other updated rules (e.g., 
(§25.1322, “Flightcrew Alerting”) or for new rules such as the rule  §25.1302 for “Installed 
Systems and Equipment for use by the Flightcrew (that became effective years before).  Since 
AC 25-7 is an authoritative guide for certification, there is a very strong potential that 
misleading guidance will be provided to or unintentionally used by certification teams.   
To be complete, we should mention that AC 25-7D points to §25.101(h) as the rule basis for 
pilot time delay allowances as previously mentioned.  AC 25-7D guidance associates delays with 
pilot actions as a method of determining the total response time for just pilot procedures as 
illustrated in figure 4-1 of AC 25-7D.  Paragraphs 4.3.4.2, 4.3.6.1, 4.3.6.2 of the AC 25-7D 
provides additional guidance to include “these procedures must be able to be consistently 
executed in service by crews of average skill, use methods or devices that are safe and reliable, 
and include allowances for any time delays in the execution of the procedures that may 
reasonably be expected in service. These requirements prohibit the use of exceptional piloting 
techniques”. 
Mitigation. If the flightcrew low airspeed alert cannot be provided early enough to be effective 
other methods including mitigation, could be considered.  There are existing examples where 
mitigation has been allowed to aid the flightcrew in their response to an alert.  Some forms of 
mitigation have only been recently available given smarter alerting systems and automation 
(e.g., automated response to TCAS RAs, automatic rudder compensation with engine failure, 
and automated braking).  Other mitigation methods may involve identifying earlier causal 
factors such as an unstable approach before a low airspeed/energy condition, thus preventing 
the low and slow condition.  
 
  
  
Conclusion 
 
Flightcrew alerting provided too late is not considered effective and has the same effect as no 
alert.  Also, a late low airspeed/energy alert cannot meet the intent of the new ASHWG 
proposed rule or its intended function which requires continued safe flight.  All time delays 
associated with the reaction and responses to a flightcrew alert as required by 25.101 (h)(3) 
must be measured or determined and considered as part of the method of compliance during 
certification for deciding when an alert must be presented to be successful.  This includes all 
the time delays, including those associated with the flightcrew, installed equipment and system 
responses and the airplane regaining safe flight.  
The measured delay times (the ToP) associated with the alerting condition must be compared 
to the AOTW.  If the response times are longer than the AOTW, the alert should not be 
considered as timely enough to permit the flightcrew to reliability continue safe flight.  This 
comparison (Actual delay times versus AOTWs) will allow the certification authority and 
industry to identify when the alert is effective as a flightcrew alert.  This method will identify 
the time limitations associated with the intended alert and will factor into identifying failure 
conditions when the alert cannot be timely enough to meet the alerts intended function.  It will 
also encourage industry to look for and then propose designs that help mitigate for those 
conditions when the alert is not effective based on identification of the limitations of the alert 
associated with time delays. 
 
  
 Appendix A 
 
Standard methods of compliance are recommended. 
 
FAA policy statement ANM-01-03A guides FAA Certification Teams conducting a review of 
applicants’ proposed methods of compliance for 14 CFR part 25 regulations related to flight 
deck human factors21. While this is guidance directed at FAA certification teams, this is also an 
indication to industry what the FAA will bear in mind for certification. While the FAA and 
industry may agree on additional methods of compliance, the following methods of compliance 
from ANM-01-03A are recommended. It should also be acknowledged that flightcrew response 
data can be collected in conjunction when gathering other ongoing compliance information 
collection.  
 
 
The following statements are mainly copied from FAA policy ANM-01-03A.   
 
Evaluations, assessments, and analyses:  
 
These are conducted by the applicant or others (not the FAA or a designee), who then provide a 
report of their results to the FAA. In cases where human subjects (flightcrews, for example) are 
used when gathering data (subjective or objective), the applicant should fully document the 
selection of subjects, what data will be collected, and how the data will be collected. Relevant 
here is that flightcrews are representative of the full cadre of pilots worldwide.  This will allow 
the FAA Certification Team to determine the extent to which the evaluations, assessments, and 
analyses provide valid and relevant information concerning finding compliance with the 
regulations.   
 
1) Engineering evaluations or analyses – These assessments can involve some techniques 
including:  
• procedure evaluations (complexity, number of steps/actions, nomenclature, etc.);  
• reach or strength analysis via computer modeling;  
• Time-Line analysis for assessing task demands, workload22.  Also flightcrew, 
equipment and airplane recovery delays; or  
• other methods, depending on the issue being considered.  
 
Carefully consider the validity of assessment techniques for analyses that are not based on 
advisory material or accepted industry standard methods, and request that applicants validate 
any computation tools used in such analyses. If analysis involves comparing measured 
                                                          
21 While the methods of compliance listed here in appendix A are considered as standard methods, these standard 
methods are also considered acceptable for determining response timing.  Appendix B is more specific to the 
question of response timing. 
22 Workload and response time allowances are often correlated. 
 characteristics to recommendations derived from pre-existing research (internal or public 
domain), then the applicant may be asked to validate the use of the data derived from the 
research.  
 (2) Part-task evaluations – These are evaluations using devices that emulate the crew interfaces 
for a single system or a related group of systems, using flight hardware, simulated systems, or 
combinations of these. Typically, these evaluations are limited by the extent to which 
acceptability may be affected by other flight deck tasks. This MOC is most easily used for stand-
alone systems. As flight deck systems become more integrated, part-task evaluations may 
become less useful as a MOC, although their utility as engineering tools may increase. A typical 
example of a part-task demonstrator for an integrated system would be an avionics suite 
installed in a mock-up of a flight deck, with the main displays and autopilot controllers included. 
Such a tool may be valuable during development and for providing system familiarization to the 
authorities. However, in a highly integrated architecture, it may be difficult or impossible to 
assess how well the avionics system will fit into the overall flight deck without complete 
simulation or use of the actual airplane. Some part-task evaluations may be performed as part 
of seeking Technical Standard Order (TSO) approval. However, a TSO does not constitute 
installation approval, which usually requires evaluation in the overall flight deck.  
(3) Simulator evaluations – These are evaluations using devices that present an integrated 
emulation (using flight hardware, simulated systems, or combinations of these) of the flight 
deck and the operational environment. They can also be “flown” with response characteristics 
that replicate, to some extent, the responses of the airplane. Typically, these evaluations are 
limited by the extent to which the simulation is a realistic, high fidelity representation of the 
airplane, the flight deck, the external environment, and crew operations. It should be noted 
that not all aspects of the simulation must have a high level of fidelity for any given compliance 
issue. Rather, simulator fidelity requirements should be determined given the issue being 
evaluated. For additional information, see section 4b(1)(iv) of FAA Advisory Circular (AC) 25-11, 
“Transport Category Airplane Electronic Display Systems,” dated July 16, 1987.  
(4) In-flight evaluations – These are evaluations using the actual airplane. Flight tests generally 
offer the most realistic and comprehensive environment for evaluating the flight crew interface 
design in realistic scenarios. Assuming that the airplane is fully configured, the integration of 
the flight crew interface features can be evaluated in a flight environment, including 
communication tasks and interaction with the ATC environment. However, typically, these 
evaluations may be limited by the extent to which the critical flight conditions (for example, 
weather, failures, or unusual attitudes) can be located or generated, and then safely evaluated 
in flight. While evaluations using the actual airplane are the closest to real operations, in some 
cases not all of the scenarios of interest can be demonstrated. The applicant may not be able to 
show certain failures or combinations of failures for a variety of technical or safety reasons. In 
such cases, applicants may find it necessary to combine flight testing with other MOCs to gain a 
complete evaluation. For additional information see FAA AC 25-11, section 4b(1).  
 Demonstrations: These are similar to evaluations (as described above), but conducted by the 
applicant with participation by the FAA or its designee. The applicant may provide a report or 
summary, requesting FAA concurrence on the findings. In each case, the applicant should note 
the limitations of the demonstration and how those limitations relate to the compliance issues 
being considered. The FAA should carefully consider which of its specialists will participate (for 
example, pilots, human factors specialists, or systems engineers), what data will be collected 
(objective and/or subjective), and how the data will be collected. This is to ensure that the 
demonstration adequately addresses the compliance issues and that there is participation by 
the appropriate FAA evaluators. Examples of demonstrations include:  
• Mock-up demonstrations  
• Part-task demonstrations  
• Simulator demonstrations  
  
  
Appendix B   
In support of the proposed guidance language shown above the simple equation below is 
provided to illustrate essential23 timeline categories (flightcrew, equipment and airplane 
response times) that should be considered when determining how far in advance a flightcrew 
low airspeed (energy) alert should precede a low airspeed (energy) condition to be effective.  It 
is recommended that the ASHWG also examine methods that industry already utilizes for 
determining pilot, equipment, and airplane recovery timelines which could serve as basis for 
guidance by the ASHWG.   
Example delay categories 
1) Time for the alerting system to generate the alert (t1).  The time to generate the alert 
can depend on several factors to include the alert’s priority when multiple alerts are 
active.  Generally, the time to generate the alert could be less than a second or a matter 
of many seconds when other alerts are active.  It is recommended that the worst case 
scenario should be examined.   
2) Time for the flightcrew to initially recognize the alert, including all interface delays and 
then correctly perform and complete all actions as required by the recovery procedure 
(t2).  All flightcrew actions should be performed without error while avoiding the low 
energy condition.  Response data tied to incorrect actions (or inaction) should not be 
included in determining a minimum time, such as actions out of order, actions required 
but not taken, and so forth. 
3) The time required to change the status of the internal airplane equipment required to 
avoid the low energy condition and go around (e.g., gear up, flaps up, engine spool up, 
and so forth)24 (t3).   
4) Time to change the energy vector (speed and direction) of the airplane to a successful 
recovery or go-around25. For example, the time to accelerate back to a safe airspeed 
and climb once additional thrust is applied (t4).   
5) The summation of response times (Ta) shown below (taken from values in points 1-4 
above) provides a simple illustration of response time delays that must be considered in 
determining how far in advance, the low airspeed (energy) alert must be provided 
before entering the low airspeed (energy) state. Obviously most of the delays will occur 
in parallel rather than in series as can be expressed on a Gant chart, by determining the 
critical time line or using more advanced methods described in the next paragraph.   
t1 + t2 + t3 + t4) = Ta    
                                                          
23 It is recognized that time is one of many essential elements required for a successful alert. 
24 It is recommended that the equipment cycle times be based on the worst case scenario.  For example the time 
to spool up the engine from a low power situation to TOGA power, however, there is concern that this maybe too 
severe of a requirement.  While this is a matter for discussion AC 25-7D uses the worst case assumption 11 times in 
the AC as a point of reference. 
25 This assumes that a successful recovery or go around represents recovery to a safe flight condition.     
 Advanced techniques 
As stated above, more advanced techniques are recommended, such as a time line 
analysis introduced in AC 25.1523-126 or similar methods that consider both linear and 
parallel actions and delays be used in the analysis.   However, the question that needs to 
be answered is whether the combined delays (the ToP) allow sufficient time for the 
flightcrew, equipment, and airplane that experience a low airspeed/energy event to 
continue to safely fly the airplane based on the AOTW.  Comparison of these two times 
(measured delay times versus AOTW times) will answer whether the alert is timely 
enough to recover the airplane safely, help define limitations, and open discussions 
regarding further mitigation.   
There has been several higher-tech programs available for making time comparisons and 
understanding workload dating back to 1976 with the Timeline Analysis Program (TLA-1) 
produced by Boeing under NASA contract NAS1-13741.  Also, modern airplanes provide the 
availability of flight data monitoring typically used for aircraft performance and maintenance 
purposes, and provides the means to characterize the statistical properties of the AOTW”.  We 
recommend that members of the ASHWG read the paper  “Available Operational Time Window: 
A Method for Evaluating and Monitoring Airline Procedures” by Houda Kerkoub Kourdali and 
Lance Sherry, George Mason University which describes an analytical method to characterize 
the statistical properties of the AOTW for use in the design and evaluation of procedures.”  
While the purpose of the paper is not specific to the low airspeed/energy alert, the techniques 
used to compare the ToP to the AOTW are apparent. The following figure from the Houda 
Kerboub paper provides a concept illustration of procedures that were and were not completed 
within the AOTW.   
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
26 AC 25.1523-1 5.b.(1) provides guidance on the importance of the time line analysis 
 AOTW for Evaluating Airline Procedures 
 
Scatter plot of time on procedure (ToP) and allowable operational time window (AOTW) for a set of flights yield 
distributions for ToP relative to the AOTW. The difference between the AOTW and the ToP for a given flight is the 
procedure buffer time (PBT). 
 
Appendix C 
 
 Important Acronyms: 
  AOTW - Allowable Operational Time Windows 
  ToP     - Time on Procedures 
 
  
 
 
